Moral Realism: Investigating the View That Moral Truths Exist Independently of Human Opinions or Beliefs
(Lecture Hall fades in, a slightly rumpled Professor stands at the podium, sipping from a comically large coffee mug with "World’s Okayest Ethicist" printed on it.)
Professor: Alright, settle down, settle down! Welcome, bright-eyed seekers of truth, to Ethics 101. Today, we’re diving headfirst into a concept that’s been tripping up philosophers for centuries: Moral Realism. Buckle up, because this one can get weird.
(Professor gestures dramatically with the mug, nearly spilling coffee on the front row.)
Professor: Essentially, moral realism posits that moral truths exist out there. Independent of what you, I, your grandma, or even a whole society believes. Think of it like gravity. Whether or not you believe in gravity, if you jump off a building, you’re gonna have a bad time. Moral realists argue that certain actions are objectively right or wrong, regardless of our subjective opinions.
(Professor clicks a remote, and a slide appears on the screen: a picture of a kitten being kicked juxtaposed with a picture of someone helping an elderly lady cross the street.)
Professor: Take these two scenarios. Kicking a kitten? Generally considered a no-no. Helping an old lady cross the street? Usually gets you a gold star (or at least a polite nod). The moral realist would argue that kicking the kitten is objectively wrong, not just because we happen to disapprove of it. It’s wrong in the same way that 2 + 2 = 5 is wrong, even if someone really believes it.
(Professor raises an eyebrow.)
Professor: But hold on! Before you all declare yourselves staunch moral realists and start compiling lists of objectively wrong things, let’s delve deeper.
I. What IS Moral Realism, Anyway?
(Slide changes to a title card: "Moral Realism: The Truth is Out There (Maybe)")
Professor: Moral Realism, at its core, is a meta-ethical theory. "Meta-ethical" just means it’s about the nature of moral claims, not about specific moral claims themselves. It answers questions like:
- Are moral claims truth-apt (can they be true or false)?
- If so, are there objective moral truths?
- Are these objective moral truths independent of human opinion?
Moral Realism answers YES to all three. 🏆
To understand this better, let’s contrast it with some other popular meta-ethical views:
| Meta-Ethical View | Are Moral Claims Truth-Apt? | Are There Objective Moral Truths? | Are They Independent of Human Opinion? | Example |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Moral Realism | ✅ Yes | ✅ Yes | ✅ Yes | "Torturing babies for fun is objectively wrong." |
| Moral Subjectivism | ✅ Yes (but truth depends on individual belief) | ❌ No | ❌ No | "Torturing babies for fun is wrong for me." |
| Cultural Relativism | ✅ Yes (but truth depends on societal belief) | ❌ No | ❌ No | "Torturing babies for fun is wrong in this society." |
| Error Theory | ✅ Yes (but all moral claims are false) | ❌ No | N/A (all claims are false) | "All moral claims, including ‘Torturing babies for fun is wrong,’ are false." |
| Emotivism | ❌ No (moral claims are expressions of emotion) | ❌ No | ❌ No | "Torturing babies for fun – BOO! 😠" |
(Professor chuckles.)
Professor: As you can see, Moral Realism is a pretty bold claim. It’s saying that there’s a moral reality out there, waiting to be discovered, like some kind of ethical Indiana Jones adventure. 🤠
II. Arguments FOR Moral Realism
(Slide changes: "Why Believe in Objective Morality?")
Professor: So, what makes people buy into this whole objective morality thing? Here are a few key arguments:
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The Argument from Moral Disagreement: This is a sneaky one. It argues that the very fact we disagree about morality implies that there’s a truth to be found. If morality were purely subjective, disagreements would be like arguing about whether chocolate or vanilla is "better." But moral disagreements often feel much more serious, like we’re trying to discover the right answer.
(Professor pulls a face.)
Professor: Imagine two tribes: one sacrifices virgins to the volcano god, the other thinks that’s barbaric. They’re not just expressing different preferences; they’re arguing about something real. Moral Realists would say one of them is closer to the objective moral truth than the other.
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The Argument from Moral Progress: We often talk about moral progress. We say that slavery is wrong, and we’ve made progress by abolishing it. But if morality were relative, "progress" would be meaningless. It would just mean we’ve changed our minds. Moral realists argue that moral progress implies a real standard against which we can measure our actions.
(Icon: A chart showing a steady upward trend labelled "Moral Progress")
Professor: The abolition of slavery, the rise of women’s rights, the fight for LGBTQ+ equality – these all seem like genuine improvements, not just arbitrary shifts in opinion.
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The Argument from Moral Intuition: This is the "gut feeling" argument. Many of us have a strong intuitive sense that certain things are just plain wrong, regardless of what anyone else thinks. Torturing puppies for fun? 😈 Even if a culture condoned it, many people would still feel it’s inherently wrong.
(Professor shrugs.)
Professor: Of course, intuition can be unreliable. It can be influenced by culture, upbringing, and personal biases. But moral realists argue that it can also point us towards genuine moral truths.
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The Argument from the Practicality of Morality: Moral realism provides a stronger foundation for moral action. If morality is objective, then we have a reason to strive for it, even when it’s difficult. If morality is subjective, then why bother?
(Emoji: 💪)
Professor: If you believe that justice is objectively good, you’re more likely to fight for it. If you think it’s just a matter of opinion, you might as well stay in bed and binge-watch Netflix.
III. Arguments AGAINST Moral Realism
(Slide changes: "The Dark Side of the Moral Force (Criticisms)")
Professor: Now, for the counter-arguments. Moral Realism is not without its critics. And they bring up some pretty thorny issues:
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The Argument from Queerness: Coined by philosopher J.L. Mackie, this is a real doozy. It argues that if objective moral truths existed, they would be utterly bizarre. What are these moral properties? How do we access them? How do they motivate us to act?
(Professor scratches his head.)
Professor: Imagine a "wrongness" property attached to kicking a kitten. What would that look like? Would it be a little red aura of disapproval? And how would that aura compel us not to kick the kitten? It all seems very… strange.
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The Argument from Moral Epistemology: This is the "how do we know?" argument. If objective moral truths exist, how do we access them? How do we tell the difference between a genuine moral truth and a deeply held belief?
(Professor points to the audience.)
Professor: You might think you know that eating meat is wrong, but how can you prove it? How can you demonstrate it to someone who genuinely disagrees? We don’t have a moral microscope to examine the ethical properties of actions.
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The Argument from Cultural Relativity: This one’s a classic. Different cultures have vastly different moral codes. What’s considered acceptable in one society might be abhorrent in another. Doesn’t this suggest that morality is simply a matter of cultural convention?
(Table showing examples of conflicting cultural practices: e.g., arranged marriage vs. free choice marriage, dietary restrictions vs. unrestricted diets.)
Professor: Of course, moral realists can argue that some cultures are simply wrong. But that raises the question: who gets to decide which culture is right? And what authority do they have?
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The Argument from Explanation: This argument suggests that we don’t need moral realism to explain our moral beliefs and behaviors. We can explain them through psychology, sociology, and evolutionary biology.
(Emoji: 🧠)
Professor: Why do we think harming others is wrong? Well, maybe it’s because empathy evolved to promote cooperation and social cohesion. We don’t need to invoke some mysterious realm of objective moral facts.
IV. Different Flavors of Moral Realism
(Slide changes: "Moral Realism: It’s Not All Black and White (Unless You’re a Moral Absolutist)")
Professor: It’s important to remember that Moral Realism isn’t a monolithic block. There are different versions, each with its own nuances:
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Moral Absolutism: This is the strictest form. It claims that there are absolute moral rules that apply to everyone, everywhere, at all times. "Thou shalt not kill" is a classic example.
(Professor holds up ten fingers.)
Professor: Moral absolutists believe there are no exceptions to these rules. Lying is always wrong, stealing is always wrong, etc. Even if lying could save someone’s life, it’s still morally wrong. This can lead to some pretty uncomfortable conclusions.
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Moral Objectivism (or Moderate Moral Realism): This is a more nuanced version. It acknowledges that moral principles are objective, but allows for some flexibility in their application. The context matters.
(Professor shrugs.)
Professor: Lying might generally be wrong, but it could be justified in certain situations, like lying to protect someone from a murderer. Stealing might be wrong, but it could be justified if you’re stealing bread to feed your starving family. Moral Objectivists believe that moral principles should be applied with wisdom and judgment.
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Cornell Realism (or Moral Naturalism): This version tries to ground morality in the natural world. It argues that moral properties are real properties that can be discovered through empirical investigation.
(Professor points to a picture of a scientist in a lab coat.)
Professor: Moral naturalists might argue that "goodness" is related to human flourishing. By studying human psychology, sociology, and biology, we can learn what conditions promote human flourishing and therefore what actions are morally good.
V. Implications and Applications
(Slide changes: "Moral Realism in the Real World")
Professor: So, why does any of this matter? What are the practical implications of believing (or not believing) in Moral Realism?
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Legal Systems: Many legal systems are based on the idea of objective justice. We believe that certain actions are inherently wrong and should be punished, regardless of whether anyone approves of them.
(Icon: Scales of Justice)
Professor: If you believe that justice is just a social construct, it might be harder to justify punishing criminals.
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International Relations: Moral Realism can influence our approach to international relations. Do we have a moral obligation to intervene in other countries to prevent human rights abuses? If you believe in objective human rights, you’re more likely to say yes.
(Picture of the Earth with the words "Human Rights" superimposed.)
Professor: If you think morality is purely relative, you might be more inclined to adopt a policy of non-interference.
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Personal Ethics: Ultimately, our beliefs about morality shape our own behavior. Do we strive to be honest, kind, and compassionate because we believe it’s objectively right, or simply because it makes us feel good?
(Emoji: 🙏)
Professor: The answer can have a profound impact on our lives.
VI. Conclusion: A Moral Maze
(Slide changes: "The End? (Or Just the Beginning…)")
Professor: So, where does all this leave us? Is Moral Realism the key to unlocking the secrets of the moral universe? Or is it a misguided attempt to impose order on a fundamentally chaotic world?
(Professor takes a long sip of coffee.)
Professor: The truth is, there’s no easy answer. Moral Realism is a complex and controversial theory, with strong arguments on both sides. It’s up to you, my bright-eyed seekers of truth, to weigh the evidence, consider the arguments, and decide for yourselves.
(Professor smiles.)
Professor: But remember, even if you don’t believe in objective morality, that doesn’t mean you can do whatever you want. We all have a responsibility to treat each other with respect and compassion, regardless of our meta-ethical beliefs.
(Professor gestures to the door.)
Professor: Now, go forth and be ethical! And try not to kick any kittens.
(Professor winks, grabs his oversized mug, and the lecture hall fades to black.)
